Cap-and-trade Bycatch Management with Costly Avoidance and Stock Uncertainty
Regulations to reduce bycatch of non-marketed marine species often impose gear restrictions, reductions in harvest of the target species, and/or spatial and temporal closures of the fishing ground. These regulations can exact significant social costs in commercial fisheries. We evaluate performance of a cap-and-trade bycatch management policy. Harvest of a target fish species, costly avoidance of the bycatch species, and harvesting efficiency are examined in a stochastic production environment with and without at-sea observability of bycatch, and with and without trade in harvest quotas and bycatch caps. Our results suggest that precise implementation of a socially optimal management plan is possible only if bycatch is observable and trade in fish quotas and bycatch cap is frictionless. Conditions exist in which quota/permit trading raises bycatch relative to a no-trade environment. The results offer useful guidance for designing cap-and-trade bycatch management programs.
Year of publication: |
2015
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Authors: | Singh, Rajesh ; Weninger, Quinn |
Published in: |
Marine Resource Economics. - University of Chicago Press. - Vol. 30.2015, 1, p. 97-97
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Publisher: |
University of Chicago Press |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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