Capital Structure Choice When Managers Are in Control: Entrenchment versus Efficiency
Year of publication: |
2003
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Authors: | Novaes, Walter |
Published in: |
The journal of business : B. - Chicago, Ill : Univ. of Chicago Press, ISSN 0021-9398, ZDB-ID 2416177. - Vol. 76.2003, 1, p. 49-82
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