Carbon Emissions, Corporate Governance, and Hostile Takeover Threats

Exploiting a unique measure of takeover vulnerability principally based on state legislations, we investigate how corporate carbon reduction efforts are influenced by the takeover market, which is widely regarded as a crucial instrument of external corporate governance. Our results show that more takeover exposure brings about significantly greater efforts to reduce carbon emissions. A rise in takeover susceptibility by one standard deviation improves carbon reduction performance by 12.81%. The findings corroborate the notion that the takeover market, acting as an external governance mechanism, compels managers to adopt policies that benefit shareholders in the long run. Further analysis robustly validates the results, including propensity score matching, entropy balancing, an instrumental-variable analysis, and Lewbel’s (2012, 2018) heteroscedastic identification. Our measure of takeover vulnerability is plausibly exogenous and thus probably reveals a causal effect, rather than a mere association