Career concerns and performance reporting in optimal incentive contracts
Year of publication: |
2012
|
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Authors: | Wolitzky, Alexander |
Published in: |
The B.E. journal of theoretical economics. - Berlin : De Gruyter, ISSN 1935-1704, ZDB-ID 2268339-2. - Vol. 12.2012, 1, p. 1-30
|
Subject: | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Informationsverhalten | Information behaviour | Karriereplanung | Career development | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader |
Other identifiers: | 10.1515/1935-1704.1869 [DOI] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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