Carrots and Sticks : Prizes and Punishments in Contests

We study optimal contest design in situations where the designer can reward high performance agents with positive prizes and punish low performance agents with negative prizes. We link the optimal prize structure to the curvature of distribution of abilities in the population. In particular, we identify conditions under which, even if punishment is costly, punishing the bottom is more effective than rewarding the top in eliciting effort input. If punishment is costless, we study the optimal number of punishments in the contest

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Year of publication:	[2009]
Authors:	Moldovanu, Benny
Other Persons:	Sela, Aner (contributor) ; Shi, Xianwen (contributor)
Publisher:	[2009]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Ranking-Verfahren \| Ranking method \| Anreizregulierung \| Incentive regulation \| Leistungsmotivation \| Work motivation

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (17 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 2008 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1122373 [DOI]
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; J31 - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials by Skill, Training, Occupation, etc ; J41 - Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012720665