Cartel Reporting under Passive Common Ownership

We consider the effect of passive common ownership on the efficacy of leniency programs to disrupt and deter cartels. Besides reducing deterrence, passive common ownership restrains the incentives of firms to come forward and denounce the cartel and therefore further favors collusion

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Year of publication:	[2022]
Authors:	Charistos, Konstantinos ; Papadopoulos, Konstantinos G.
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Kartell \| Cartel \| Eigentümerstruktur \| Ownership structure \| Kartellrecht \| Antitrust law \| Unternehmenskonzentration \| Market concentration \| Theorie \| Theory

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (20 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments February 5, 2022 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.4027622 [DOI]
Classification:	K21 - Antitrust Law ; L12 - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies ; L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013299252