Cartel Stability under Product Differentiation

This note considers cartel stability when the cartelized products are vertically differentiated. If market shares are maintained at pre-collusive levels, then the firm with the lowest competitive price-cost margin has the strongest incentive to deviate from the collusive agreement. The lowest-quality supplier has the tightest incentive constraint when the difference in unit production costs is sufficiently small

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Year of publication:	2020
Authors:	Marini, Marco A.
Publisher:	[2020]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Produktdifferenzierung \| Product differentiation \| Kartell \| Cartel \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Duopol \| Duopoly

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (8 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Economics Letters, Vol. 174, 2019 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments June 14, 2019 erstellt
Classification:	D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

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