Cascading controls : the effects of managers' incentives on subordinate effort to help or harm
Year of publication: |
February 2018
|
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Authors: | Christ, Margaret H. ; Vance, Thomas W. |
Published in: |
Accounting, organizations and society : an international journal devoted to the behavioural, organizational and social aspects of accounting. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0361-3682, ZDB-ID 83016-1. - Vol. 65.2018, p. 20-32
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Subject: | Contract frame | Incentives | Bonus | Penalty | Leader-member exchange | Führungskräfte | Managers | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Theorie | Theory | Führungsstil | Leadership style | Anreiz | Leistungsmotivation | Work motivation |
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