Cashing by the hour : why large law firms prefer hourly fees over contingent fees
Year of publication: |
2008
|
---|---|
Authors: | Garoupa, Nuno ; Gómez, Fernando |
Published in: |
The journal of law, economics, & organization. - Cary, NC [u.a.] : Oxford Univ. Press, ISSN 8756-6222, ZDB-ID 634985-7. - Vol. 24.2008, 2, p. 458-475
|
Subject: | Rechtsberufe | Legal profession | Zeitlohn | Hourly wage rate | Preis | Price | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Theorie | Theory |
-
Moral hazard and legal services contracts
Graham, Bradley J., (2014)
-
Effiziente Fixlöhne, Arbeitsfreude und Überwachungskosten
Neunzig, Alexander R., (2002)
-
Effiziente Fixlöhne, Arbeitsfreude und Crowding-Effekte
Neunzig, Alexander R., (2002)
- More ...
-
The path breaking contributions of A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell to law and economics
Garoupa, Nuno, (2009)
-
Paying the price for being caught : the economics of manifest and non-manifest theft in Roman law
Garoupa, Nuno, (2008)
-
Garoupa, Nuno, (2004)
- More ...