Catalytic Finance: When Does It Work?

In a simple model of currency crises caused by creditor coordination failure, we show that bailouts that reduce ex post inefficiency will sometimes create ex ante moral hazard but will sometimes enhance the incentives for governments to take preventative actions. This model helps us understand a debate about the role of the IMF in catalyzing lending to developing countries.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2003-02
Authors:	Morris, Stephen ; Shin, Hyun Song
Institutions:	Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University
Subject:	Moral hazard \| Financial crisis \| International financial architecture \| Global games

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Published in Journal of International Economics (2006), 70: 161-177 The price is None Number 1400 21 pages
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; F33 - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005087386