Central bank contracts with multiple principals
Year of publication: |
2006
|
---|---|
Authors: | Campoy-Miñarro, Juan C. ; Negrete, Juan Carlos |
Published in: |
Inflation, fiscal policy, and central banks. - New York, NY : Nova Science Publ., ISBN 1-60021-122-4. - 2006, p. 83-99
|
Subject: | Geldpolitik | Monetary policy | Regelbindung versus Diskretion | Rules versus discretion | Inflationsbekämpfung | Anti-inflation policy | Zentralbankunabhängigkeit | Central bank independence | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Interessenvertretung | Interest group | Theorie | Theory |
-
Contract cost in central banking : treating the symptom vs. treating the disease?
Campoy, Juan Cristobal, (2010)
-
Output contracts for central banks in a monetary union : a way out of the deflation bias
Campoy-Miñarro, Juan C., (2009)
-
Flexible rules cum constrained discretion : a new consensus in monetary policy
Arestis, Philip, (2009)
- More ...
-
Rigidities and inflationary bias in a monetary union : the consequences of EU enlargement
Campoy-Miñarro, Juan C., (2008)
-
Diseño de bancos centrales en economías abiertas : las ventajas del enfoque legislativo
Campoy-Miñarro, Juan C., (2004)
-
La idoneidad del Pacto de Estabilidad y Crecimiento : un enfoque estratégico
Campoy-Miñarro, Juan C., (2005)
- More ...