Central bank independence and price stability: evidence from OECD-countries
In this paper, we use a non-parametric regression method to compare the transition process from high to low inflation with the implementation dates of central bank independence reforms. In most countries, price stability is achieved before more independence is given to the central bank. Moreover, for those countries which have implemented a central bank independence reform under a high inflation regime, no evidence is found that the reforms have actually led to price stability. This suggests that the credibility of a low inflation goal can be achieved without institutional reforms which grant the central bank more independence from the political policymakers. Copyright 2008 , Oxford University Press.
Year of publication: |
2008
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Authors: | Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov ; Luna, Xavier de |
Published in: |
Oxford Economic Papers. - Oxford University Press. - Vol. 60.2008, 3, p. 410-422
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Publisher: |
Oxford University Press |
Saved in:
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