Central bank independence and the value of ambiguity : a reputational game between a central bank, the government, and commercial banks
Year of publication: |
2000
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Authors: | Gangopadhayay, Partha ; Baruphakēs, Giannēs |
Published in: |
Rivista internazionale di scienze economiche e commerciali : RiSEC ; pubblicazione trimestrale. - Padova : CEDAM, ISSN 0035-6751, ZDB-ID 4636-X. - Vol. 47.2000, 4, p. 531-557
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Subject: | Zentralbankunabhängigkeit | Central bank independence | Reputation | Inflation | Theorie | Theory | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games |
Extent: | graph. Darst |
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Type of publication: | Article |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
Language: | English |
Notes: | In: Rivista internazionale di scienze economiche e commerciali |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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