Centralized vs. De-centralized Multinationals and Taxes

The paper examines how country tax differences affect a multinational enterprise’s choice to centralize or de-centralize its decision structure. Within a simple model that emphasizes the multiple conflicting roles of transfer prices in MNEs - here, as a strategic pre-commitment device and a tax manipulation instrument -, we show that (de-)centralized decisions are more profitable when tax differentials are (small) large.

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Year of publication:	2005
Authors:	Nielsen, Søren Bo ; Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis ; Schjelderup, Guttorm
Institutions:	CESifo
Subject:	centralized vs. de-centralized decisions \| taxes \| MNEs

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	CESifo Working Paper Series.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 1586
Classification:	F23 - Multinational Firms; International Business ; H25 - Business Taxes and Subsidies ; L23 - Organization of Production
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005406207