CEO inside debt and hedging decisions : lessons from the US banking industry
Year of publication: |
2013
|
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Authors: | Belkhir, Mohamed ; Boubaker, Sabri |
Published in: |
Journal of international financial markets, institutions & money. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 1042-4431, ZDB-ID 1117317-8. - Vol. 24.2013, p. 223-246
|
Subject: | Inside debt | Executive compensation | Bank risk | Hedging | Financial regulation | Führungskräfte | Managers | USA | United States | Managervergütung | Bankrisiko | Bank | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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