CEO pay disparity : efficient contracting or managerial power?
Thi Thanh Nha Vo, Jean Milva Canil
Year of publication: |
2019
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Authors: | Thi Thanh Nha Vo ; Canil, Jean Milva |
Published in: |
The journal of corporate finance : contracting, governance and organization. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0929-1199, ZDB-ID 1189269-9. - Vol. 54.2019, p. 168-190
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Subject: | Compensation | Options | Incentive | CEO power | Efficiency | FASB ASC 718 | Führungskräfte | Managers | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Effizienz | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Theorie | Theory | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Macht | Power |
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