CEO Talent, CEO Compensation, and Product Market Competition

We develop a structural industry equilibrium model to show how competitive CEO-firm matching and product markets jointly determine firm value and CEO pay. We analytically derive testable implications for the effects of product market characteristics on firm size, CEO pay, and CEO impact on firm value. CEO talent matters more in more competitive markets with greater product substitutabilities. Our CEO impact estimates are much higher than those obtained by previous structural approaches that abstract away from CEO market segmentation. The estimates differ across industries primarily due to variation in product market competition, rather than variation in the CEO talent distribution

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Year of publication:	2016
Authors:	Jung, Hae Won (Henny)
Other Persons:	Subramanian, Ajay (contributor)
Publisher:	[2016]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Führungskräfte \| Managers \| Wettbewerb \| Competition \| Leistungsentgelt \| Performance pay \| Managervergütung \| Executive compensation \| Unternehmenserfolg \| Firm performance \| Lohn \| Wages \| Hochqualifizierte Arbeitskräfte \| Highly skilled workers

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (107 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Forthcoming Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments July 17, 2016 erstellt
Classification:	G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance ; D21 - Firm Behavior ; d22 ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure Size; Size Distribution of Firms ; M12 - Personnel Management
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012986527