CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation

This paper shows that CEOs are fired after bad firm performance caused by factors beyond their control. Standard economic theory predicts that corporate boards filter out exogenous industry and market shocks from firm performance before deciding on CEO retention. Using a hand-collected sample of 3,365 CEO turnovers from 1993 to 2009, we document that CEOs are significantly more likely to be dismissed from their jobs after bad industry and, to a lesser extent, after bad market performance. A decline in industry performance from the 90th to the 10th percentile doubles the probability of a forced CEO turnover

MoreLess

Year of publication:	[2014]
Authors:	Jenter, Dirk
Other Persons:	Kanaan, Fadi (contributor)
Publisher:	[2014]: [S.l.] : SSRN

freely available

Full text |

More access options

doi.org

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (34 p)
Series:	Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper ; No. 1992
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 15, 2014 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.885531 [DOI]
Classification:	G30 - Corporate Finance and Governance. General ; G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance ; D20 - Production and Organizations. General ; D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; M51 - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions (hiring, firing, turnover, part-time, temporary workers, seniority issues)
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012709867