CEO Wage Dynamics : Estimates from a Learning Model

The level of Chief Executive Oﬃcer (CEO) pay responds asymmetrically to good and bad news about the CEO's ability. The average CEO captures approximately half of the surpluses from good news, implying CEOs and shareholders have roughly equal bargaining power. In contrast, the average CEO bears none of the negative surplus from bad news, implying CEOs have downward rigid pay. These estimates are consistent with the optimal contracting benchmark of Harris and Holmstrom (1982) and do not appear to be driven by weak governance. Risk-averse CEOs accept signiﬁcantly lower compensation in return for the insurance provided by downward rigid pay

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Year of publication:	2020
Authors:	Taylor, Lucian A.
Publisher:	[2020]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Führungskräfte \| Managers \| Lernprozess \| Learning process \| Lohn \| Wages \| Schätzung \| Estimation

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (53 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Vol. 108, No. 1, 2013 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 16, 2012 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1686068 [DOI]
Classification:	D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge ; G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance ; J31 - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials by Skill, Training, Occupation, etc ; J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; J41 - Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012857523