Chapter 12 Incentive models of the defense procurement process

Economic theorists have devoted considerable attention to analyzing models of closely related incentive contracting problems that arise in the study of public procurement, private procurement, regulation, the theory of the firm, the theory of organizations, and managerial compensation. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an introduction to the incentive models literature as it applies to defense procurement.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	1995
Authors:	Rogerson, William P.
Published in:	Handbook of defense economics : volume 1. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISBN 0-444-81887-1. - 1995, p. 309-346
Subject:	defense procurement \| contracts \| incentives \| principal agent models \| R&D \| economies of scale \| innovation \| moral hazard \| strategic behavior \| competition \| auctions \| Moral Hazard \| Moral hazard \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Militärauftrag \| Military contract \| Beschaffung \| Procurement \| Skalenertrag \| Returns to scale \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Öffentlicher Auftrag \| Public contract

Online Resource

Check full text access |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In libraries world-wide (WorldCat)

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.1016/S1574-0013(05)80014-6 [DOI]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024419