Chapter 60 Game-theoretic analysis of legal rules and institutions

We offer a selective survey of the uses of cooperative and non-cooperative game theory in the analysis of legal rules and institutions. In so doing, we illustrate some of the ways in which law influences behavior, analyze the mechanism design aspect of legal rules and institutions, and examine some of the difficulties in the use of game-theoretic concepts to clarify legal doctrine.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2002
Authors:	Benoît, Jean-Pierre ; Kornhauser, Lewis A.
Published in:	Handbook of game theory with economic applications : volume 3. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISBN 978-0-444-89428-1. - 2002, p. 2229-2269
Subject:	economic analysis of law \| Coase Theorem \| accidents \| positive political theory \| voting power \| Rechtsökonomik \| Economic analysis of law \| Coase-Theorem \| Coase theorem \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Institutionenökonomik \| Institutional economics \| Neue politische Ökonomie \| Public choice \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Noncooperative game

Online Resource

Check full text access |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In libraries world-wide (WorldCat)

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.1016/S1574-0005(02)03023-0 [DOI]
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making ; K0 - Law and Economics. General
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024485