Chapter 8. Social Norms
Year of publication: |
2011
|
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Authors: | Burke, Mary A. ; Young, H. Peyton |
Published in: |
Handbook of social economics : volume 1. - Amsterdam : Elsevier/North-Holland, ISBN 0-444-53713-9. - 2011, p. 311-338
|
Subject: | Norm | convention | increasing returns | dynamical systems | stochastic stability | evolutionary game theory | Soziale Norm | Social norm | Evolutionäre Spieltheorie | Evolutionary game theory | Evolutionsökonomik | Evolutionary economics | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.1016/B978-0-444-53187-2.00008-5 [DOI] |
Classification: | C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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