Characterization of revenue equivalence

Birgit Heydenreich; Rudolf Müller; Marc Uetz

The property of an allocation rule to be implementable in dominant strategies by a unique payment scheme is called revenue equivalence. In this paper we give a characterization of revenue equivalence based on a graph theoretic interpretation of the incentive compatibility constraints. The characterization holds for any (possibly inn̄ite) outcome space and many of the known results about revenue equivalence are immediate consequences.

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Year of publication:	2007
Other Persons:	Heydenreich, Birgit (contributor) ; Müller, Rudolf (contributor) ; Uetz, Marc (contributor)
Publisher:	Evanston : Northwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Subject:	Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Allokation \| Allocation \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Noncooperative game \| Neue politische Ökonomie \| Public choice \| Graphentheorie \| Graph theory \| Theorie \| Theory

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Extent:	Online Ressource, (20 S.) graph. Darst.
Series:	Discussion paper / Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University. - Evanston, Ill. : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ZDB-ID 2186959-5. - Vol. 1448
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/31193 [Handle]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003782066