Characterization of the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set in a non-cooperative model of dynamic policy-making with a persistent agenda setter
Year of publication: |
2012
|
---|---|
Authors: | Diermeier, Daniel ; Fong, Pohan |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 76.2012, 1, p. 349-353
|
Subject: | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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