Characterization of the von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set in a non-cooperative model of dynamic policy-making with a persistent agenda setter
Year of publication: |
2012
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Authors: | Diermeier, Daniel ; Fong, Pohan |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 10029448. - Vol. 76.2012, 1, p. 349-354
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