Characterizing solution concepts in terms of common knowledge of rationality
Year of publication: |
May 2017
|
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Authors: | Halpern, Joseph Y. ; Moses, Yoram |
Published in: |
International journal of game theory : official journal of the Game Theory Society. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0020-7276, ZDB-ID 120387-3. - Vol. 46.2017, 2, p. 457-473
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Subject: | Characterizing solution concepts | Common knowledge of rationality | Sequential equilibrium | Perfect equilibrium | Quasi-perfect equilibrium | Rationalität | Rationality | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Gleichgewichtstheorie | Equilibrium theory | Vollkommene Information | Complete information |
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