Charity auctions: a field experiment
Auctions are a popular way to raise money for charities, but relatively little is known, either theoretically or empirically, about the properties of charity auctions. We conduct field experiments to see which sealed bid format, first price, second price or all-pay, raises the most money. Our experiment suggests that both the all-pay and second price formats are dominated by the first price auction. Our design also allows us to identify differential participation as the source of the difference between existing theory and the field. Copyright 2008 The Author(s). Journal compilation Royal Economic Society 2008.
Year of publication: |
2008
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Authors: | Carpenter, Jeffrey ; Holmes, Jessica ; Matthews, PeterHans |
Published in: |
Economic Journal. - Royal Economic Society - RES, ISSN 1468-0297. - Vol. 118.2008, 525, p. 92-113
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Publisher: |
Royal Economic Society - RES |
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