Charity Auctions with Multiple Goods : Bidding Behavior and Revenue

In a charity auction with multiple goods, we show that the highest-losing bid uniform price auction revenue dominates its lowest-winning bid counterpart. Only in the highest-losing bid uniform price auction is bidding independent of the number of goods and players and revenue increasing in the number of goods

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Groves, Vivienne
Publisher:	[2011]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Auktion \| Auction

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (9 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Economics Letters, Vol 111, p 166-169, 2011 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments November 5, 2009 erstellt
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; D62 - Externalities ; D64 - Altruism
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013134228