Cheap Talk and Co-ordination with Payoff Uncertainty

Two players seek to co-ordinate their behavior in an incomplete information setting. We show that if each player's preferences over his opponent's action is independent of his own action or type, then cheap talk cannot expand the set of equilibrium outcomes.

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Year of publication:	1998-12
Authors:	Baliga, Sandeep ; Morris, Stephen
Institutions:	Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	CFP 1043. Published in Journal of Economic Theory (2002), 105(2): 450-468 The price is None Number 1203 19 pages
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762494