Cheap talk with an exit option : a model of exit and voice
Year of publication: |
November 2017
|
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Authors: | Shimizu, Takashi |
Published in: |
International journal of game theory : official journal of the Game Theory Society. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0020-7276, ZDB-ID 120387-3. - Vol. 46.2017, 4, p. 1071-1088
|
Subject: | Exit | Voice | Cheap talk | Informativeness | Credibility | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Kommunikation | Communication | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Glaubwürdigkeit | Exit-Strategie | Exit strategy |
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