Cheating alone and in teams

There is a reward for a project that can be increased through ability, effort, and cheating. This is analysed for one agent and a team of two. As an extension, a preference for honesty is added, which can prevent cheating but not without limit and not so easily in the team context.

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Year of publication:	2021
Authors:	Dilger, Alexander
Publisher:	Münster : Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Institut für Organisationsökonomik

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Series:	Diskussionspapier des Instituts für Organisationsökonomik ; 1/2021
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	1747925039 [GVK] hdl:10419/229960 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:umiodp:12021 [RePEc]
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law ; z20 ; z22
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012428559