Cheating as a dynamic marketing strategy in monopoly, cartel and duopoly
Year of publication: |
2020
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Authors: | Eigruber, Markus ; Wirl, Franz |
Published in: |
Central European journal of operations research. - Heidelberg : Physica-Verl., ISSN 1613-9178, ZDB-ID 2093829-9. - Vol. 28.2020, 2, p. 461-478
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Subject: | Cheating | Differential game | Competition | Dieselgate | Duopol | Duopoly | Kartell | Cartel | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Monopol | Monopoly | Wettbewerb | Dynamisches Spiel | Dynamic game | Betrug | Fraud | Unternehmenskonzentration | Market concentration | Marketingmanagement | Marketing management |
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