Taking into account the specific circumstances of developing countries and their national particularities in the design of their respective competition laws has been one of the main lessons that could be drawn from the several studies immersing into the relationship between competition and economic development. China seems to dwell on the by Frédéric Jenny’s launched idea that 'there is no one size fits all competition law.' Not only has China inscribed provisions dealing with cartel agreements, unilateral exclusionary conduct or concentrations in its newly adopted Anti-Monopoly Law (hereinafter AML), but also provisions dealing with the abuse of administrative power. Further, to allow the enforcement authorities some flexibility in the interpretation of the AML, several standards, such as 'public interest', 'justifiable cause', and 'national security', 'national economic development', or 'other elements…have an effect on the market competition', have been incorporated. The flexibility that these standards offer in terms of interpreting the AML according to the needs of the Chinese economy has also inherent dangers. The standards increase the amount of discretion of the enforcement authorities, potentially giving an incentive for firms to lobby for an outcome in favor of their interests. Further, these standards allow for the incorporation of different interests, such as consumer interests, interests of small and medium sized companies, social interests or even environmental interests. The different interests could complicate the decision making process, possibly leading inexperienced enforcement authorities to conclusions that are more harmful to their economy. On top of that, bureaucrats, especially in countries that have relied on centralized planning or heavy government involvement in business affairs, are able to determine or influence the outcome of competition law cases by the use of these standards. Focusing on the potentiality of lobbying, which often results in wrongly taken decisions, firms could take this as an opportunity to shield them from any form of competition. In the end, such an environment will lead to inefficient outcomes on the market. Even with an unchanged cost structure or portfolio on products, these firms will have their market position secured. Any incentive to innovate either the production process or the products themselves will disappear. Price levels will thereby rise, evidencing allocative inefficiency or productive inefficiency. New production processes or products will not be put into the market, exemplifying dynamic inefficiency. As a consequence, the inefficient firms will drain the available resources that could have otherwise been spent for other purposes. In the long run, this inefficient spending will mortgage substantial growth and development. The aim of this paper is to seek an answer to the question to which end of the balance the interpretation of the AML, full of provisions with undetermined standards, will bend. Reformulated, the question could read as whether the AML’s standards could provide China a legal instrument suitable to support economic development. An answer to this question can only be given if another issue is resolved: what are the criteria to decide what kind of interpretations can contribute to economic development
