Choice Flexibility and Long-Run Cooperation
Cooperation does not easily scale up—strategic uncertainty increases as groups get larger, preventing coordination on the cooperative equilibrium. In an indefinitely repeated social dilemma experiment conducted in small and large groups, we add partial cooperation choices to the usual rigid binary-choice task, and vary systematically the benefits partial cooperation bestows upon counterparts. Making cooperation choices more flexible can raise cooperation and efficiency in large groups, moving it closer to the levels attained in smaller groups—where it had no effect. An insight is that richer choice sets may form the basis of an economically meaningful language that can facilitate coordination on cooperation. Choosing partial cooperation offers a way to cheaply and meaningfully signal a cooperative intention to a stranger, and reduce strategic uncertainty
Year of publication: |
[2023]
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Authors: | Camera, Gabriele ; Kim, Jaehong ; Rojo Arjona, David |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
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