Choice in insurance markets : a pigouvian approach to social insurance design
Year of publication: |
12 September 2020
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Authors: | Hendren, Nathan ; Landais, Camille ; Spinnewijn, Johannes |
Publisher: |
London : Centre for Economic Policy Research |
Subject: | Sozialversicherung | Social insurance | Arbeitslosenversicherung | Unemployment insurance | Zahlungsbereitschaftsanalyse | Willingness to pay | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Pigou-Steuer | Pigouvian tax | Versicherungsökonomik | Economics of insurance | Theorie | Theory | USA | United States | Schweden | Sweden | Nordeuropa | Northern Europe |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (circa 38 Seiten) Illustrationen |
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Series: | Discussion papers / CEPR. - London : CEPR, ZDB-ID 2001019-9. - Vol. DP15285 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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