Choice under Partial Uncertainty.
This paper analyzes problems of choice under uncertainty where a decisionmaker does not use subjective probabilities. The decisionmaker has a set of beliefs about which states are more likely than others, but his beliefs cannot be represented as subjective probabilities. Three main kinds of decision rules are possible in this framework. These are maximin-type, maximax-type, and choosing that action that gives the highest payoff in the state, which the decisionmaker believes to be most likely. The author replaces the commonly used 'merger of states' axiom with a version of the sure-thing principle. Copyright 1993 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
Year of publication: |
1993
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Authors: | Kelsey, David |
Published in: |
International Economic Review. - Department of Economics. - Vol. 34.1993, 2, p. 297-308
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Publisher: |
Department of Economics |
Saved in:
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