Choosing Among Signalling Equilibria in Lobbying Games

Randolph Sloof has written a comment on the lobbying-as-signalling model in Rasmusen (1993) in which he points out an equilibrium I missed and criticizes my emphasis on a particular separating equilibrium. In this response, I discuss how to interpret multiple equilibria in games and how to interpret mixed strategy equilibria in which two types of player with identical incentives must pick different mixing probabilities.

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Year of publication:	1996-07-24
Authors:	Rasmusen, Eric
Institutions:	EconWPA

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Extent:	application/pdf application/x-tex application/postscript
Series:	Game Theory and Information.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Can be found in ps via my website,
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D8 - Information and Uncertainty
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407585