Expressions of concern that climate change will lead to insecurity and violence are heard increasingly, originally often voiced by senior military in the US. Imagined causal relationships have tended to be crude and simplistic, as if there was a linear linkage between climate change impacts, millions of “climate refugees” and outbreaks of violence. The topic of climate change and security is now on the agenda of the UN Security Council; the UN Secretariat has established the Climate Security Mechanism to support UN missions in their assessment and management of climate risk. An effort by Niger and Ireland to have the UNSC mandate a special climate security envoy in late 2021 failed because of Russian and Chinese vetoes. Climate and security are also on the agendas of the EU and AU. Still, however, climate and insecurity are defined rather vaguely as a new risk and an area of concern, with little in terms of clearly defined causal linkages and operational guidance. The recent IPCC 6th Assessment Report helps with the evidence base by summarizing the current state of knowledge, largely based on retrospective studies in East Africa: climate change generally has a limited impact on conflicts in comparison with political and socio-economic factors but may influence the duration, seriousness and severity of conflicts. These risks increase considerably, however, in contexts that are already unstable and insecure and where an agriculture-based economy is heavily dependent on the variability of weather and climate. When vulnerability is exacerbated by social cleavages and weak institutions, climate security risks increase even further. Frequently used climate risk frameworks distinguish between climate exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity, where the latter ultimately determines the vulnerability of nations and societies. An important element of adaptive capacity is the quality of governance, where political stability, absence of violence, openness and non-discrimination tend to raise adaptive capacity. In Sudan, all factors enhancing climate insecurity are present, including tensions and displacement related to the control over natural resources, land and water in particular. At the same time, the 2019 revolution has put Sudan’s climate predicament squarely on the national agenda, through institutional strengthening, inclusion in constitutional documents and peace agreements, renewed and evidence-based analyses, and the articulation of ambitious climate programs, spearheaded by youth and women groups. Ultimately, the success of efforts at protecting the population against climate risk and build future resilience is intimately linked to the return to political transformation