Clock games: Theory and experiments
In many situations, timing is crucial--individuals face a trade-off between gains from waiting versus the risk of being preempted. To examine this, we offer a model of clock games, which we then test experimentally. Each player's clock starts upon receiving a signal about a payoff-relevant state variable. Since the timing of the signals is random, clocks are de-synchronized. A player must decide how long, if at all, to delay his move after receiving the signal. We show that (i) delay decreases as clocks become more synchronized, and (ii) when moves are observable, players "herd" immediately after any player makes a move. Our experimental results are broadly consistent with these two key predictions of the theory.
Year of publication: |
2010
|
---|---|
Authors: | Brunnermeier, Markus K. ; Morgan, John |
Published in: |
Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 68.2010, 2, p. 532-550
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Clock games Experiments Currency attacks Bubbles Political revolution |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Clock games : theory and experiments
Brunnermeier, Markus Konrad, (2010)
-
Peace agreements without commitment
Brunnermeier, Markus K., (2010)
-
Clock Games : Theory and Experiments
Morgan, John, (2010)
- More ...