Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation
Year of publication: |
2020
|
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Authors: | Korpela, Ville ; Lombardi, Michele |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 121.2020, p. 108-116
|
Subject: | Implementation theory | Incomplete Information | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information |
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