Co-Optation & Clientelism : Nested Distributive Politics in China's Single-Party Dictatorship

What explains the persistent growth of public employment in reform-era China despite repeated and forceful downsizing campaigns? Within China, why do some provinces have more public employees and experience higher rates of bureaucratic expansion than others? Among electoral regimes, the creation and distribution of public jobs is typically attributed to the politics of vote-buying and multi-party competition. Electoral factors, however, cannot explain the patterns observed in China's single-party dictatorship. This study highlights two nested factors that influence public employment in China: party co-optation and personal clientelism. As a collective body, the ruling party seeks to co-opt restive ethnic minorities by expanding cadre recruitment in hinterland provinces. Within the party, individual elites seek to expand their own networks of power by appointing clients to office. The central government's professed objective of streamlining bureaucracy is in conflict with the party's cooptation goal and individual elites' clientelist interest. As a result, the size of public employment has inflated over the years despite top-down mandates to downsize bureaucracy