Coalition formation in simple games: The semistrict core

We consider the class of proper monotonic simple games and study coalition formation when an exogenous share vector and a solution concept are combined to guide the distribution of coalitional worth. Using a multiplicative composite solution, we induce players' preferences over coalitions in a hedonic game, and present conditions under which the semistrict core of the game is nonempty.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2006-03
Authors:	Dimitrov, Dinko ; Haake, Claus-Jochen
Institutions:	Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, Universität Bielefeld
Subject:	coalition formation \| semistrict core \| simple games \| winning coalitions

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 378 20 pages
Classification:	D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; C71 - Cooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005002268