Coalition-proof Nash equilibria and cores in a strategic pure exchange game of bads
Year of publication: |
2006
|
---|---|
Authors: | Hirai, Toshiyuki ; Masuzawa, Takuya ; Nakayama, Mikio |
Published in: |
Mathematical social sciences. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : NH, Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4896, ZDB-ID 283230-6. - Vol. 51.2006, 2, p. 162-170
|
Subject: | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Core |
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