Coalition Stability with Heterogeneous Agents

We analyze coalition formation with heterogeneous agents based on an individual stability concept. Defining exchanging and refractory agents, we give existence and enlargement conditions for coalitions with heterogeneous agents. Using the concept of exchanging agents we give necessary conditions for internal stability and show that refraction is a sufficient condition for the failure of an enlargement of the coalition.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Caparrós, Alejandro ; Giraud-Héraud, Eric ; Hammoudi, Abdelhakim ; Tazdaït, Tarik
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 31.2011, 1, p. 286-296
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Subject:	Heterogeneity \| Coalition \| Exchanging \| Refraction

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; L0 - Industrial Organization. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008794447