Coalitional manipulations in a bankruptcy problem

In a bankruptcy problem framework we consider rules immune to possible manipulations by the creditors involved in the problem via merging or splitting of their individual claims. The paper provides characterization theorems for the non manipulable rules, the no advantageous merging parametric rules and the no advantageous splitting parametric rules.

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Year of publication:	1999-09-24
Authors:	Frutos, M. Angeles de
Published in:	Review of Economic Design. - Springer. - Vol. 4.1999, 3, p. 255-272
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Axiomatic analysis \| merging \| splitting

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	Received: 24 February 1998 / accepted: 9 March 1999
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; C71 - Cooperative Games ; D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753081