Coalitional unanimity versus strategy-proofness in coalition formation problems
Year of publication: |
2013
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Authors: | Takamiya, Koji |
Published in: |
International journal of game theory : official journal of the Game Theory Society. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0020-7276, ZDB-ID 1203873. - Vol. 42.2013, 1, p. 115-130
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