Coarse correlated Equilibria in Linear Duopoly Games

For duopoly models, we analyse the concept of coarse correlated equilibrium using simplesymmetric devices that the players choose to commit to in equilibrium. In a linear duopoly game, we prove that Nash-centric devices, involving a sunspot structure, are simple symmetric coarse correlated equilibria. Any small unilateral perturbation from such a structure fails to be an equilibrium.

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Year of publication:	2012-07
Authors:	Ray, Indrajit ; Gupta, Sonali Sen
Institutions:	Department of Economics, University of Birmingham
Subject:	Duopoly \| Coarse Correlation \| Simple devices \| Sunspots

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Series:	Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	20 pages
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010617483