Coasian Dynamics in Repeated English Auctions
We extend the Coase conjecture to the case of a seller with a single object, who faces n potential buyers and holds a sequence of English auctions until the object is sold. In an independent-private-values environment in which buyers and sellers share the same discount factor, we show that the (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium path of reserve prices obeys a Coasian logic. Moreover, the equilibrium reserve path lies below that for the model of repeated sealed-bid, second-price auctions studied by McAfee and Vincent (1997). Nevertheless, the open (English) and sealed-bid formats are shown to be revenue equivalent.
Year of publication: |
2007
|
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Authors: | Menezes, Flavio M. ; Ryan, Matthew J. |
Institutions: | School of Economics, University of Queensland |
Saved in:
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