Collaborative incentive contracts: stimulating competitive behaviour without competition
One of the major and recurring problems in designing cost incentive contracts is related to setting target cost and a risk-sharing ratio. With the standard sharing formula, contractors or alliance partners are incentivized to artificially inflate their target cost in order to maximize profit and minimize risk. Knowing that, owners attempt to pressure contractors by using various mechanisms, which are time-consuming and may jeopardize collaborative relationships afterwards. A fair risk-sharing formula is suggested that incentivizes the contractors or alliance partners to truthfully submit their target cost. The main tangible benefit is in removing suspicion and fostering trust and collaborative relationships between the contracting parties.
Year of publication: |
2014
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Authors: | Boukendour, Saïd ; Hughes, Will |
Published in: |
Construction Management and Economics. - Taylor & Francis Journals, ISSN 0144-6193. - Vol. 32.2014, 3, p. 279-289
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Publisher: |
Taylor & Francis Journals |
Saved in:
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