Collateral and Adverse Selection in Transition Countries
This paper tackles the question of knowing whether collateral helps to solve adverse selection problems in transition countries. We use a unique data set of about four hundred bank loans in sixteen transition countries. Our findings support the view of a positive link between the presence of collateral and the risk premium, which accords with the observed risk hypothesis. This suggests that collateral does not mitigate adverse selection problems in transition countries.
Year of publication: |
2009
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Authors: | Weill, Laurent ; Godlewski, Christophe J. |
Published in: |
Eastern European Economics. - M.E. Sharpe, Inc., ISSN 0012-8775. - Vol. 47.2009, 1, p. 29-40
|
Publisher: |
M.E. Sharpe, Inc. |
Saved in:
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